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fine of 1000 guilders on those who went on the pilgrimage without a passport. The resolution was revised in 1831, and the fine was reduced to twice the cost of the passport cost (220 guilders). Since these two resolutions were applicable only to Java and Madura, in which the government exerted a relatively strong authority, many pilgrims opted to go through Sumatra to avoid the h} ajj tax. Fearing that the strict regulations on the h} ajj would be counterproductive to its authority, the government repealed both resolutions and introduced a third one in 1852. This resolution maintained the passport but rescinded the h} ajj tax. This expansive period was short lived and seven years later the government introduced another resolution (in 1859) which set out a far stricter regulation of the pilgrims. This resolution was severely criticized by C. Snouck Hurgronje on the grounds that all the restrictions on h} ajj affairs would exert a negative effect on Dutch interests in the East Indies. Some restrictions were repealed by Staatsblad 1902 No. 318, and Staatsblad 1905 No. 228 . Then, seventeen years later, in 1922, the government issued a new resolution in which possession of an 'obligatory return ticket' was introduced. Although this seems to contradict Snouck Hurgronje's advice, it was in fact related to his suggestion that the pilgrims who stayed in Mecca for a long time were potentially dangerous because they might be contaminated by the possible influence of Pan-Islamism. Some further restrictions were introduced six years late in 1928 in a decree in which it was stated that the government would reject the passport application of suspect persons.
2 Most of the issues arising from the h} ajj regulations during this period were closely related to worries about the stability of Dutch colonialism in the East Indies. Pilgrimage to Mecca was seen as the source of political trouble and revolts.
The most relevant point to note in the context of this study is that the h} ajj services were organized by private agencies. The government merely regulated the h} ajj administration and checked the -----------------2 On the h} ajj during Dutch colonial period, see Jacob Vredenbregt, 'The Haddj: Some of its Features and Functions in Indonesia', Bijdragen tot de Taal-Land en Volkenkunde, 118 (1962) , pp. 91-154; Daniel van der Meulen, 'The Mecca Pilgrimage and its Importance to the Netherlands East Indies ', Muslim World, XXXI (1941) , pp. 48-60; see also Dick Douwes and Nico Kaptein (eds.), Indonesia dan Haji (Jakarta: INIS, 1997). pilgrims, but was not involved in the organization of h} ajj tourism. It has been only since the eclipse of this colonial regime that the h} ajj has developed into a huge religious tourism business. The three most important private h} ajj travel agencies in colonial times were Kongsi Tiga, Herklots and Alsegoff & Co.
3 Besides these, there were also professional Pilgrim Leaders (Shaykh), who accompanied the pilgrims from their departure from their home country and aided them in many ways, including finding lodgings for them, and Pilgrim Agents (Mutawwif) who were from Mecca and served as a general aid and guide, including, as did Pilgrim Leaders, finding somewhere for them to stay. 4 Because of the many abuses to which the pilgrims were subjected and other concomitant problems, in the 1920s Muslim organizations, prominent among them are the Muhammadiyah, the Sarekat Islam (SI) and later the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), attempted to reform h} ajj services and managed to organize the journey for the h} ajj by chartering their own ships. The idea was good in principle but these well-intentioned endeavours failed. 5 During the Japanese occupation and World War II, there was no specific policy relating to the h} ajj. None of the Dutch regulations concerning the h} ajj were revised. However, because of the war and the concomitant insecurity and risks travel involved, plus a serious economic decline, neither the Japanese occupation government nor Muslim organizations organized any h} ajj services. Hadji 1385 H/1965 -1966 (Jakarta: Departemen Urusan Haji, 1966 ), pp. 18-20, hereafter, Laporan (1966 ; Sumuran Harahap and Mursidi, Lintasan Sejarah Perjalanan Jemaah Haji Indonesia (Jakarta: Intimedia & Insan Cemerlang, n.d.), Governing H{ ajj: Politics of Islamic Pilgrimage Services in Indonesia
-----------------

C. H{ ajj Services in Post-Independence Era
During the years immediately following the Declaration of Independence on 17 August 1945, the new Indonesian state had to face the so-called 'second Dutch aggression' (according to Indonesian) or 'police action' (according to the Dutch who were at pains to stress that this was a domestic conflict). At that harrowing time, Masjumi, led by KH Hasjim Asj'ari, issued a fatwa stating that: 'It is haram (forbidden) for Muslims to leave their motherland while it is being attacked by the enemy in order to colonise and destroy religion. Therefore, there is no obligation to perform the h} ajj when there is fard 'ayn (personal obligation) to go to war against the colonization of nation and religion'. 6 The fatwa was then endorsed by the MORA Announcement (Maklumat) No. 4/1947 A.III/1/648, dated 9 February 1950, stipulating that the only institution recognized by their respective governments to organize h} ajj services was PHI. Four years later, Minister of Religious Affairs, KH Masjkur, issued a Decree buttressing the previous decrees and establishing the PHI Foundation as the only institution with the proper credentials to work in the field of h} ajj travel on 13 April 1954 (Ministerial Decision No. 9/ 1954 . 9 To facilitate arrangements, the Bank Hadji Indonesia (BHI) and the shipping company, Pelajaran Muslimin Indonesia (MUSI), were set up simultaneously. Because of the precarious financial situation in Indonesia, MUSI did not have its own ships but chartered them from other shipping companies. The Majelis Pimpinan Haji (MPH-Council for H{ ajj Guidance) was also established to instruct the prospective pilgrims and guide them during the pilgrimage.
During the so-called Guided Democracy period when the doctrine of NASAKOM (Nasionalisme, Agama, KomunismeNationalism, Religion, Communism) was being promulgated, Soekarno tried to introduce some 'reforms' in h} ajj services. His attempts can be classified into several phases. In the first phase, 1959-1962 10 The decree came into force on 1 September 1959. As the title of the decree indicates, it announced that PHI's privilege as the only institution with the authority to organize the h} ajj service had been allowed to lapse and that PHI had been transformed into a fully private foundation (yayasan partikelir). The relationship between MORA and PHI was merely a 12 In 1962, MUSI and the Bank Haji were dissolved. PHI teetered on the brink of dissolution, but was defended by a number of Muslim leaders. 13 Noer argued that the dissolution of MUSI and the Bank Haji was related to the banning of Masjumi in 1960 (because of the alleged involvement of some of its leaders in the PRRI/Permesta revolt), on the grounds that many members of PHI and MUSI were Masjumi members.
14 This controversial policy elicited severe criticism from Muslim leaders, especially those involved-directly or indirectly-in the so-called 'h} ajj travel reform' movement.
The second phase, 1962-1964, was one in which the government proposed a new concept of h} ajj services reform. The reason for this was that the previous policy had done nothing to improve h} ajj services, and nor putting any fine point on it too, the policy had also deteriorated it . The role of the Coordinating Minister for Public Welfare, Muljadi Djojomartono, who had also played a role in h} ajj reform during Dutch era, was vital. Now, contrary to his role in the pre-independence era, Djojomartono now acted as a government representative. He was appointed as the head of the Panitia Perbaikan Perjalanan Haji (P3H-Committee for the Reform of the H{ ajj Travel Arrangements) by Soekarno in 1962. 15 This committee was entrusted with two important tasks: 1) a short-term task, consisting of formulating guidelines for and defining the respective scopes of government and private agencies and institutions in h} ajj affairs, and formulating the major technical tasks to be tackled in running h} ajj services; 2) a long-term task, amending the 1922 H{ ajj Resolution and other Dutch colonial regulations on the h} ajj, introducing statutory regulations which were in accordance with the 1945 Constitution. 16 With the 'moral support' of the Minister of Religious Affairs, Prof. KH Saifuddin Zuhri, P3H invited the PHI foundation to play a role again in national h} ajj services. 17 In this phase the cooperation between the government and the private h} ajj institution (PHI) was restored.
In the third phase, 1964-1966, the authority of the government was expanded, and the role of private agencies and institutions was centralized in the government-supported PHI and PT Arafat. This was authorized by Presidential Decree No. 122/1964 on The Organization of H{ ajj Services, dated 5 May 1964. 18 Under the terms of this decree, MORA was no longer the only government player in h} ajj affairs. It seems likely that the decree was issued in anticipation of the involvement of the Coordinating Minister for Public Welfare, which later grew more prominent. This Presidential Decree states that 'The organization of h} ajj services is a national duty, and therefore it falls under the authority of the Coordinating Ministry of Public Welfare'. This was not the only change instigated by the Decree. P3H was replaced by a new institution, namely the Dewan Urusan Haji (DUHA-Board for H{ ajj Affairs), which was led by Djojomartono. As the head of DUHA, he was the main architect of the establishment of [DUHA] to purchase special h} ajj ships would be realized …by using pilgrims' own money.… Each h} ajj candidate who applies this year will be obliged to give their share to the Bank Indonesia in Jakarta…. Those who did not send the money would have their application rejected'. He also said: 'Like other shares, at certain times dividends or profits would be shared, if PT [Arafat] made a profit'. 21 About two months later, PT Arafat, which was responsible for purchasing and managing (1) deciding policies concerning the h} ajj services; (2) managing the h} ajj services and overseeing everything related h} ajj affairs both in the home country and abroad; (3) improving the education of h} ajj candidates by raising their religious awareness and improving their knowledge, especially on the subject of the h} ajj and the national persona; (4) guiding the 'souls' of pilgrims after their return home: 'So that they are useful to their religion, their nation and their state'. 23 During this period, the role of MORA in this was limited to issuing statements concerning mahram at the time of application. In 1965, the Minister of H{ ajj Affairs issued Decree of the Minister of H{ ajj Affairs No. 16/1965 to boost -----------------22 PT Arafat managed seven ships: the Gunung Djati, the Tjut Njak Dhien, the Ambunombo, the Pacific Abeto, the Belle Abeto, the Le Havre Abeto, and the La Grande Abeto. However, it seems that most of the ships were hire-purchased, with the exception of the Tjut Njak Dien (formerly named Princes Irene), which was bought from a company in the Netherlands. Here, another ministry, the Ministry of Maritime Transportation, was involved. The status of the ships was, in fact, not clear. One of the new developments in h} ajj services in this period was the emergence of the so-called Haji Berdikari (Independent Pilgrims), that is: 'Those who go on the h} ajj pilgrimage using their own foreign exchange...to cover their expenses during their pilgrimage in Saudi Arabia and have Rupiah currency to take a return ship from Jeddah to Indonesia '. 27 At that time, foreign exchange was provided by the government through the Indonesian Embassy in Jeddah. Those who had their own foreign exchange (at least $ 100) could arrange their own h} ajj. However, they were obliged to register with MORA, and the quota for Haji Berdikari was decided by MORA. 28 This programme relieved the candidate pilgrims of the long and complicated procedure of h} ajj registration.
D. Governing H{ ajj in New Order Era: Establishing Monopoly
The first three years after the establishment of the New Order regime in 1966, the government continued the previous policies on h} ajj affairs. It was reported that many candidate pilgrims failed to make the pilgrimage because of the mismanagement of such 'irresponsible private h} ajj agencies and brokers', as Mukersa Haji, Al-Ichlas h} ajj agency, and YAMU'ALIM (Yayasan Mu'awanah lil Muslimin). To overcome the problem, the government decided not only to increase the involvement of the state in h} ajj affairs, but in fact to go as far as to assume a monopoly on h} ajj affairs, by issuing Presidential Decree No.
----------------- 24 On the details of the PHI's tasks, see In relation to this [policy on h} ajj], again, I would like to emphasize that the government does not intend to restrict the Islamic ummah's freedom to accomplish their religious obligations in any way whatsoever; instead, the government wants to establish some order in the h} ajj, protecting the Islamic ummah from the malpractices of certain private agents who had caused dissatisfaction and loosed among h} ajj candidates…. On 4 December 1974, the aircraft chartered from the Dutch company Martinair, by Garuda Indonesia Airlines, crashed in Colombo, Sri Lanka. The number of victims who lost their lives was 182 pilgrims, 9 crew members plus 2 pramugari and pramugara recruited from IAIN. Minister of Religious Affairs Abdul Mukti Ali made an announcement on the national television station, TVRI (Televisi Republik Indonesia), and the national radio station, RRI (Radio Republik Indonesia), on 6 December 1976, explaining all matters relating to the tragedy, including expressing his hope that Muslims believed that this was the destiny allotted by God and that the victims were 'syuhada' haji' (h} ajj martyrs).
34
Beginning in 1978 h} ajj travel was organized exclusively by plane, because PT Arafat had ceased to operate. 35 The official reasons given were that it was in the throes of a management reform and consolidation. There were four national airline companies involved: PT Garuda Indonesia Airways (GIA); Merpati Nusantara Airlines; Mandala; and Bouraq. However, in practice, because of the shortage of aircraft, they were allowed to charter aircraft from other international airlines. On 15 November 1978, the so-called 'Colombo Tragedy' reoccurred when an Icelandic Loftleider plane, chartered by GIA, crashed at Katunayake International Airport Colombo. One hundred and seventy-six pilgrims (out of 262) and eight airline crew were killed. 36 Again, MORA declared the victims were 'syuhada'' (martyrs).
In 1979, PT Arafat was declared bankrupt. Therefore, h} ajj by ship was officially abandoned, and thereafter h} ajj travel was organized solely by plane. 37 However, traumatized by the Colombo Tragedy, many Muslim leaders and members of the legislature proposed that h} ajj transportation by ship to be restored. They argued that making the h} ajj by ships was 'safer' than by airplane: '…the pilgrims have more time to prepare themselves physically and spiritually'. It was considered 'more appropriate for Indonesian lay pilgrims, [and] …the pilgrims are able to take more luggages'. Despite the cogency of their arguments, the government did not agree, and decided to continue to limit h} ajj travel to transportation by airplane for reasons of effectiveness and efficiency.
38
At the beginning of the 1980s, the government re-emphasized its authority to take charge of the organization of h} ajj services. Soeharto issued Presidential Decree No. 53/1981 on H{ ajj Services (hereafter, the 1981 PDHS). 39 It contained three important points: 1) The organization of h} ajj affairs was a national duty and conducted only under the aegis of the government; 2) The organization of h} ajj affairs was carried out with the coordination and under the responsibility of the Minister of Religious Affairs; 3) The cost of making the h} ajj (ONH, Ongkos Naik Haji) was to be decided by the President basing his assessment on the proposal of the Minister of Religious Affairs, after also having won the opinion of the Ministry of Finance.
40
The 1981 PDHS was in fact an echo of the previous Presidential Decree of 1969. The government, especially MORA, had a monopoly on the expedition of h} ajj affairs. As mentioned in Decree of the Minister of Religious Affairs No. 2/1982, when it organized matters pertaining to the h} ajj, MORA was expected to cooperate, horizontally, with other ministries, namely those of: Home Affairs, Health, Transportation, Foreign Affairs, Justice, Finance, Trade and Cooperation, Defence and Security, and Information. Vertically, MORA had to collaborate with the governors and bupatis as the provincial and district organizers of h} ajj. The involvement of these other ministries and government offices was necessitated by the stipulation that 'the organization of h} ajj affairs is a national duty'.
In the spirit of the times, Minister of Religious Affairs Alamsyah Ratu Perwiranegara related the h} ajj to development. In his speech at the closing ceremony of the Working Conference on H{ ajj Affairs in 1982, he stated that: 1) The h} ajj is one of the links in the chain of the process of development of 'fully rounded Indonesian people' (manusia Indonesia seutuhnya), and therefore contributes towards the maturation of a nation which is progressive (maju), faithful (beriman) and Godfearing (bertaqwa); 2) h} ajj officials are real servants of the h} ajj working in the spirit of public service without any attempt to accrue themselves material benefits; 3) Offering h} ajj service is an act of religious devotion ('ibada) and if the h} ajj officials are sincere (ikhlas) in carrying out their work, they will be rewarded (in the Hereafter). 41 The first point summed up the ideological doctrine of the New Order, which was to become a major slogan in the 'development of religious affairs' (pembangunan agama). The second and the third emphasized the devotional nature of h} ajj services. At the end of the 1980s, the government re-opened the gate for the limited involvement of the private agencies in h} ajj services, under the auspices of MORA. This was based on Decree of the Minister of Religious Affairs No. 22/1987 on Decision of the Organization of ONH Plus Pilgrimage. This led to the emergence of the so-called 'ONH Plus' pilgrims or h} ajj plus, 42 a special h} ajj service organized for middleclass Muslims who felt in need of special treatment and facilities during the h} ajj. The ONH plus pilgrims were those registered as 'ordinary' pilgrims at MORA but who then re-applied to the private h} ajj agencies for special treatment and facilities against the payment of the extra costs decided by the agencies. This new way of making the h} ajj began to win favour among the Muslim middle class at the end of the 1980s.
The year 1990 witnessed a tragic accident in the Muaisim Tunnel, Mina, Saudi Arabia, in which more than 600 Indonesian pilgrims died. It became known as the 'Mina Tragedy' and the victims have gained recognition as 'syuhada' Mina' (the Martyrs of Mina). 43 This tragedy had two important upshots. The first was the establishment of H{ ajj Hospitals (Rumah Sakit Haji) in Medan, Ujung Pandang, Surabaya, and Jakarta 'as monuments to commemorate the Mina Tragedy'. 44 The second was that Soeharto decided to perform h} ajj pilgrimage himself in 1991, accompanied by his family and some of his ministers. This was a great political landmark, signifying his growing inclination towards Islam which had become more apparent since the end of the 1980s.
45
Many Islamic organisations expressed their happiness at Soeharto's personal decision to make the h} ajj. A new 'non-official' name 'Haji Muhammad Soeharto' was associated with him, especially when he addressed Muslim communities. Although considered appropriate on such religious occasions, this new name was not used for official
ONH is the abbreviation of Ongkos Naik Haji (cost of pilgrimage). 43 On the Mina Tragedy, see Heru Soeyono, Musibah Terowongan Al-Muaishim Haratul Lisan Mina (Klaten: Yayasan Ki Juru Mertani, 1990) ; Nur Cholis Huda, Kisah Musibah Terowongan Mina (Surabaya: Bina Ilmu, 1990) . 44 See Rumah Sakit Haji Jakarta (Jakarta: Rumah Sakit Haji Jakarta, 1994), pp. 13-4; hereafter, Rumah Sakit; Mimbar Pembangunan Agama, No. 80, May 1993, pp. 24-5. 45 On the journalistic reports about Soeharto's pilgrimage, see Tim Penyusunan dan Penerbitan, Perjalanan Ibadah Haji Pak Harto (Jakarta: Departemen Agama RI, 1993). documents. After he had shown the way, the h} ajj pilgrimage became popular among government officials and political figures, and triggered the emergence of what became known as 'political hajj' (haji politik).
The growing number of pilgrims, especially those from the middle class, fuelled the development of the h} ajj tourism business. 46 This prompted the government to improve the regulation on the 'ONH Plus'. The Minister of Religious Affairs issued Decree No. 245/1991 on the Organization of 'ONH plus', dated 1 October 1991. 47 This contained the rules for making an application for ONH Plus and regulated departure to and from the Holy Land, setting out rules that the private h} ajj agencies were expected to follow. The Achilles heel in this decree was that it did not regulate the ONH Plus organizers. Therefore it was necessary to promulgate yet another Ministerial Decree No. 246/1991 on the Appointment of 'ONH Plus' Organizers in 1992. This was issued on 21 November 1991 for the purpose of designating thirteen h} ajj agencies and fixing certain rules for the running of their business.
48
The organization of ONH Plus pilgrimage in 1992 was best filled with host of problems. The organizers booked their clients on the regular h} ajj flights which caused problems for regular h} ajj services. It also meant that there were unequal prices, an excess of the quota, and some pilgrims were simply handed over to other organizers. Embarrassed by these problems, Minister Munawir Sjadzali issued Decree No. 218/1992 on the Decision of the Organization of the
On the anthropological study of the 'h} ajj plus', see Moeslim Abdurrahman, 'On H} ajj Tourism: In Search of Piety and Identity in the New Order Indonesia', PhD Dissertation, (Urbana-Champaign: the Graduate College of the University of Illinois, 2000) . 47 Strong sanctions were imposed on any organizers who violated the Decree. Their permit might be withdrawn or might not be extended.
The significant development in the numbers participating in the h} ajj at the beginning of the 1990s necessitated the introduction of a new regulation. To rectify the situation, Soeharto issued Presidential Decree No. 62/1995 on the Organization of H{ ajj Services, which, in the vein of previous regulations, emphasized the government monopoly in this business by stipulating that: 'The organization of h} ajj affairs is a national duty and is undertaken only by the government'. 50 The 'h} ajj affairs' considered the responsibility of the government and stated in the decree that its duties were: the planning of the organization of the h} ajj; deciding the cost of h} ajj; accepting and registering the pilgrims; checking, serving and protecting the health of pilgrims; receiving and managing the costs of the h} ajj; arranging the h} ajj passports; arranging for training for and guidance of the pilgrims; managing the safety, order and material welfare of pilgrims during the duration of the h} ajj; taking care of the accommodation for the pilgrims; managing the transportation of the pilgrims; ensuring the proper delivery and security of the pilgrims' luggage; controlling the administrative and technical matters pertaining to the organization of h} ajj affairs; overseeing the organization of h} ajj; and any other activities related to the successful conclusion of the h} ajj.
51 This covers almost the entire scope of the organization of h} ajj services, and all of these activities were to be centered at MORA.
The mid-1990s was marked by a boom in the h} ajj. In 1995, something in the order of 231,000 persons applied to undertake h} ajj, exceeding the quota given by the Saudi government, 195,000 pilgrims, by nearly 40,000. The international quota of pilgrims was decided by Saudi Government on the basis of the agreement reached at the 1987 Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) in Amman which stipulated In contrast to matters pertaining to the h} ajj, which fell entirely under the aegis of the government, the organization of the 'umrah was handed over to private agencies, especially those which specialized in organizing collective pilgrimages. Individual pilgrims were also allowed to arrange their own 'umrah journey. The government (MORA) functioned merely as regulator. By 1979, this system was in need of revision and hence regulation of the 'umrah was enacted in 1979, when MORA and the Ministry of Justice issued a Joint Decree on 'umrah Services. This step was prompted by the fact that a number of 'umrah pilgrims did not come straight back but lingered on in Mecca until the H{ ajj month in order to make the h} ajj. This produced big problems for both the Saudi and Indonesian governments, because many of them found themselves in severe financial straits because they did not have the wherewithal for their daily needs, let alone the money to purchase a ticket home. However well-intentioned they were, the regulations did not put an end to the practice. At the beginning of the 1980s, 'umrah was being pretty effectively regulated by the government. Nevertheless, the earlier stratagem of protracting the 'umrah until the month of the h} ajj was still widely resorted to because of the high cost and complicated procedures involved in going on the h} ajj. In 1983, it was reported that the number of 'unofficial hajj' (haji gelap) who managed to perform the h} ajj by overstaying after their 'umrah amounted to 24,000 compared to 50,000 official h} ajj in that same year. 54 In 1983, Soeharto issued Presidential Decree No. 63/ 1983 on 'umrah. Although the decree stipulated unequivocally that: 'The organization of 'umrah travel is not in the hands of the government of the Republic of Indonesia', it also forestalled the possible overstay of 'umrah pilgrims until the h} ajj month.
55 'Umrah pilgrimage could be undertaken by individuals, including those with family members as long as these did not exceed five, or in group, which should be organised by 'umrah travel agencies (Penyelenggara Perjalanan 'Umrah) recognized by the Minister of Religious Affairs. There was no tight regulation of individual 'umrah pilgrims, except exacting that they should promise to return soon after completing the 'umrah, be in possession of a health certificate issued by a government doctor and have enough money to cover their costs during the pilgrimage. 56 The requirements placed on the 'umrah travel agencies were strict, and included such measures as having to draw up an itinerary; managing to send and bring back the pilgrims according to plan; completing the travel documents; arranging accommodation and health care; managing the purchasing and ensuring the availability of tickets from and to the hometown of the pilgrims; giving proper training in and guidance about 'umrah; and making a report on their 'umrah services to the Minister of Religious Affairs. 57 Sanctions were also imposed on those which violated the decree, but these were not specified in detail. They were simply referred to as 'sanctions according to the statutory regulations'. 58 To ensure the necessary regulation of the private 'umrah travel agencies, the Minister of Religious Affairs issued Decree No. 1/1984, which stipulated further requirements for opening an 'umrah travel agency and the potential sanctions for violating the rules. 59 Moreover, the itinerary devised and the subsequent report on 'umrah travel organized by private agencies were also placed under stricter regulation. 60 Other ministries which had a finger in the pie also issued regulations concerning 'umrah: In the case of 'umrah, in principle, the regulations stipulate that 'umrah is to be undertaken outside the month of h} ajj (as well as two months before and one month after it), and it could be done individually or collectively. The aim of all these regulations was to enhance the quality of 'umrah services offered by private agencies.
Encouraged by the growing 'umrah travel business, many private 'umrah travel agencies were opened. Many agencies did not confine their activities to organising the 'umrah pilgrimage, but also offered the opportunity to visit other religious sites in the Holly Land, and even the Al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem. On 21 November 1991, the Minister of Religious Affairs issued Decree No. 280/1991 designating twentythree private agencies to organize 'umrah travel, including the thirteen agencies involved in the 'ONH Plus'. On 15 July 1996, Soeharto issued Presidential Decree No. 57/ 1996 on 'Umrah Travel Organization, to regulate 'umrah travel by private agencies, revising the 1983 Presidential Decree. The regulation of the organization of 'umrah travel by private agencies was tightened to prevent the combination of the cheap 'umrah with expensive h} ajj and to eliminate the abuse and mismanagement so often perpetrated by the private agencies. However, in general, there was no significant change in government policy concerning the 'umrah. The government certainly did not want to be involved in organizing its itinerary. This was probably caused by the fact that there is no quota imposed on the 'umrah pilgrimage, and it does not have to be undertaken in a certain set period which forces the pilgrims to travel in massive groups, but can be embarked on at any time (although regulated, the exceptions being the two months before and one month after the h} ajj month). Despite its somewhat distant attitude to 'umrah, it would be fair to say the Government actually did manage to control both the h} ajj and 'umrah pilgrimages and the organization of their services.
F. H{ ajj Fund
The organization of h} ajj was a huge business that produced a lot of money. 62 The most controversial matter related to this business was the existence of the 'h} ajj fund', which later, under Minister of Religious Affairs Tarmizi Taher, was called the Dana Ongkos Naik Haji (H{ ajj Cost Fund). 63 Taher announced that the Dana Ongkos Naik Haji was an outcome of a 'pembenahan' (reform) of the financial management.
64
The existence of such a fund dates back in fact to 1970 when Soeharto -----------------62 Zamakhsyari Dhofier, 'Dampak Ekonomi Ibadah Haji di Indonesia ', Prisma, vol. 13, no. 4, 1984, pp. 51-61. 63 Under Minister Munawir Sjadzali, according to Amidhan, the then Director General of the Guidance of Islamic Community and H} ajj Affairs, the fund was unofficially called 'Dana Brankas Besi' (Iron Box Fund). 'Haji dan Rimba Raya Dana Abadi', in S. Satya Dharma (ed.) was: '…collected from the ummah (pilgrims) and used for the betterment of the ummah'. Nevertheless, the existence of the Dana Ongkos Naik Haji was criticized by many parties, including NGOs, which claimed that the government had acted as a corporate business which collected benefits from its services.
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G. Conclusion
The above description has shown that h} ajj (and 'umrah) had burgeoned into profitable religious tourism for both the government and private travel agencies. The government had enjoyed a monopoly of h} ajj services from 1969 and this did not end with the collapse of the New Order regime in 1998. The involvement of the private agencies in organizing 'h} ajj plus', which began in the 1980s, could be seen as a mere sub-organization of the business, rather than real demonopolization of h} ajj services. The failure of some reform efforts to improve the management of h} ajj (and 'umrah) services was mainly caused by the complex relations between religious piety on the part of the pilgrims on one hand and political as well as economic considerations on the part of Government and travel agencies on the other hand. Due to this fact, it is understandable that the reform efforts of h} ajj services could not easily conducted because these would greatly affect the very interests of both the Government and travel agencies. Becoming the regulator and at the same time the travel agency itself, the Government could not manage to reform h} ajj services appropriately.
----------------- 71 The name of this institution was later changed into Dana Abadi Ummat (DAU-Umma Perpetual Fund) in 1999, which is beyond the scope of this study.
